O sofrimento psíquico na encruzilhada entre o mecanismo e a norma
Palavras-chave:
Saúde-doença, Medicalização, transtornos mentais, normativismo, teorias híbridas da psicopatologiaResumo
Diferentes concepções de “saúde” e “doença” subjazem perspectivas medicalizantes ou críticas no campo da saúde mental. Neste ensaio, analiso concepções naturalistas (Boorse, Szasz) e normativistas (Engelhardt Jr., Fulford, Goosens, Margolis) sobre saúde e transtorno mental, apontando os limites dessas concepções. A partir de uma aproximação crítica com as teorias “híbridas” (que apontam para a materialidade psicobiológica fundamental dos transtornos ao mesmo tempo em que sustentam que juízos avaliativos socialmente construídos subjazem toda afirmação sobre “doença”), argumento que o status de transtorno dado a um conjunto de sintomas está sempre emaranhado em uma dimensão social, cultural, e política, e não é um “fato natural”, ainda que seja metafisicamente dependente de processos psicobiológicos. Assim, sob uma organização político-econômica capitalista, os juízos avaliativos são dependentes da posição do indivíduo em um binômio produtivo-improdutivo, dependentes metafisicamente de fenômenos psicobiológicos, mas irredutíveis a esses.
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